Trivium is a notable light-weight synchronous stream cipher submitted to the European eSTREAM project in April 2005. State recovering attack is the best known attack to Trivium. In this paper, we study the structure of Trivium and point out the equations used in the state recovering attack are linearly dependent. The number of the equations is not enough to derive the exact solution. Then the revisional state recovering attack will be given to correct the problem of origin attack. We show that the internal state of Trivium will be recovered in time around 88.8 2 , and the keystream has the length of 57.8 2 . Therefore, the revisional attack is still faster than the exhaustive search
Introduction
Trivium is a notable light-weight synchronous stream cipher designed by Christophe De Canniere and Bart Preneel, which is submitted to the European eSTREAM project in April 2005 [1] . This algorithm is designed to be both efficient and secure. During 3 phases of eSTREAM evaluation on the stream cipher proposals, the performance of Trivium is outstanding compared with other stream ciphers such as A5. Trivium outperforms other eSTREAM candidates considered in the paper in terms of the two most important optimization criteria, minimum area and maximum throughput to area ratio, by a factor of at least two [2] .
Since now, there are many works about the security of Trivium. The first known result is actually given on the eSTREAM discussion forum where the complexity to recover the internal state from given keystream is argued to be 135 2 which is much slower than exhaustive search [3] . Raddum presents a technique to solve systems of equations associated with Trivium [4] . But his attack is very complex when applied to the full cipher and the attack complexity is 164 2 . Borghoff presents a numerical attack [5] . However the estimated time complexity of this attack is about 63. 7 2 seconds. The cube attack proposed by Pierre-Alain Fouque and Thomas Vannet requires 68 2 steps to break a variant of Trivium. However, the number of initialization rounds is reduced to 799 [6, 7] . Maximov studies two attacks on Trivium , which are statistical tests and state recovering attack [8] . Statistical tests are not good since the attacks are no faster than exhaustive search. State recovering attack is the best known attack to Trivium. The internal state of the full Trivium can be recovered in time around 83.5
.
In this attack, Maximov try to recover one third of the states with 96 linear equations in the phase I and the others with 192 linear equations in the phase II. However, this attack contains some serious problems. In this paper, we point out that both the first 96 equations and the next 192 equations are linearly dependent. The number of linear equations is not enough to derive the exact solution.
The following part of the paper is organized as follows. The algorithm of Trivium will be described in section 2. Section 3 point out the problem of the state recovering attack. The revisional attack will be proposed in section 4. The conclusion will be given in section 5.
Trivium Algorithm
Trivium [1] is designed to generate up to 64 2 bits of key stream from an 80-bit secret key Key and an 80-bit initial value IV. The process consists of two phases: first the internal state of the cipher is initialized using Key and IV, then the state is repeatedly updated and used to generate key stream bits. There are 288 bits in the internal state, which is denoted as
. Trivium is designed as hardware oriented. Evaluation on implementation of Trivium for low-power application in RFID system is given by Feldhofer with comparison to AES-128 [10] . Synthesis result of Trivium is better than that of AES-128. Trivium has three rounds with similar structure. Denote the intermediate variable as 1 u u n u u n u u n         are the parameters, which is shown in Table I : 1  1  3  2  5  3   3  3  3  3  3  3   66  93  162  177  243 288 
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Problem of State Recovering Attack
In the state recovering attack, given the output stream z , the target is to recover the internal state of the cipher. Since all blocks of the cipher are divisible by 3. And the transition of the internal state from time t to time t+1 is a linear transformation of the subset   2 mod 3 t Tt  , plus a minor one bit disturbance from the adjacent two subsets. Therefore, in the state recovering attack, the main idea is to guess the state   However, the number of linear equations is not enough to derive the exact solution, not only in the phase I but also in the phase II. In fact, in phase I, we have the theorem as follows: 
where   g g is a primitive polynomial.
Therefore, the characteristic polynomial of   i st is also   
Since ' Tt are one, through the simulation results, the rank will be changed to 188. Then 4 equations cannot be used. Therefore, in the phase II, the remaining state will not be recovered by the collected 3 2n linear equations. We still need to guess some state. In the next section, the error of the origin state recovering attack will be corrected and the revisional state recovering attack will be given.
Revisional State Recovering Attack And Attack Results
In the revisional state recovering attack, given the output stream z , our target is to recover the internal state of the cipher. The main idea is as same as the origin attack. We first guess the state   0 Tt at some time t, then recover the rest of the bits.
In order to receive more linear equations, we consider a set of terms: 11   22   33   3  2  3 1  91  92   3  2  3  1  175  176   3  2  3  1  286  287   3 1  3 1  3 1  3 1 , 0,1, ,  1   3 1  3 1  3 1  3 1 , 0,1, ,  1   3 1  3 1  3 1  3 1 , 0 
The most probable guess would be that all the terms are zeros, since  
Conclusion
In this paper, we study the internal structure of Trivium and state recovering attack which is the best known attack to Trivium. We point out that the equations used in the state recovering attack are linearly dependent. Therefore, the number of the equations is not enough to derive the exact solution. The revisional state recovering attack is proposed in section 4.
We show that the internal state of Trivium will be recovered in time around 88.8 2 , and the keystream has the length of 57. 8 2 . Therefore, the revisional attack is still faster than the exhaustive search.
